































education,	 but	 allowed	 the	 State	 to	 force	 citizens	 to	 study.	 He	 defended	 women	











friend	 of	 liberty	 could	 not	 find	 the	 logic	 in	 family,	 marriage,	 religion,	 tradition,	











organizations	 belong	 to	 the	 State,	 the	 country	 can	 have	 freedom	 of	 the	




and,	more	 importantly,	 individual	 liberty.	He	criticized	opponents	of	 the	
free	 market	 and	 competition,	 fought	 progressive	 taxation,	 in	 particular	




























are	 profoundly	 hostile	 to	 freedom.	 He	 defended	 the	 private	 property	 of	




current	 interventionist	 fallacies,	 condemning	 exaggerated	 consumption	
and	praising	a	 supposedly	 idyllic	 stationary	 state.	He	 criticized	general	
public	 education,	 but	 allowed	 the	 State	 to	 force	 citizens	 to	 study.	 He	
defended	women	and	men’s	 freedom,	but	not	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose	 the	
number	of	children	they	wanted	to	have,	or	decide	about	their	education,	
or	 bequeath	 goods	 to	 them.	 He	 said	 parting	 from	 laissez	 faire	 was	 bad	
unless	it	produced	some	good.	He	warned	of	the	dangers	of	socialism,	but	






Trapped	 between	 social	 romanticism	 and	 utilitarian	 rationalism,	
Mill	appears	to	be	an	imprecise	eclectic	aiming	at	the	same	time	at	the	
supremacy	of	 the	 individual	and	 the	greatest	happiness	 of	 the	greatest	

















Leaving	 aside	 erroneous	 theories,	 Mill	 postulated	 two	 classes	 of	
acceptable	interventions:	the	necessary	and	the	optional.	For	the	necessary	
ones	he	relied	on	Adam	Smith:	 there	can	be	no	market	without	respect	







State	 interventionism	 (Schwartz	 1972,	 116;	 Bowley	 1967,	 265;	 Platteau	
1991,	121).	He	examined	various	types	of	market	failure	that,	over	time,	


























































and	must	be	 the	 instrument	 for	guaranteeing	and	extending	 individual	
liberties”	 (Dewey	 2000,	 17).	 The	 seeds	 were	 planted	 long	 ago:	 classical	
liberalism	 retreated	 during	 the	 supposedly	 liberal	 nineteenth	 century,	
and	 politicians	 like	 Joseph	 Chamberlain	 argued	 that	 political	 criticism	
was	 justified	only	when	there	was	no	democracy.	Echoes	of	 this	naivety	
are	 visible	 in	 the	 recent	 demand	 of	 republicanism	 theory	 to	 preserve	











and	admirer	of	Toccqueville,	Mill	does	not	accept	 this	 fully,	but	when	 it	
came	 time	 to	 defend	 liberty,	 he	 ignored	 private	 property	 and	 voluntary	














This	 author	 also	 points	 to	 an	 analogous	 problem	 in	 a	 celebrated	





2006).	 In	 Berlin	 we	 find	 the	 typical	 arguments	 interventionists	 use	 to	
discuss	 liberty	 and	 its	 dangers,	 including	 the	 popular	 though	 mistaken	





to	 see	 Berlin	 backing	 Mill	 because	 the	 English	 economist	 believed	 that	
without	State	 intervention	 the	weakest	would	be	 squashed,	 that	 is,	 the	


















urgent	 needs	 of	 neighbors.	There	 exists	 a	 nebulous	 border	 between	 not	
avoiding	harm	and	provoking	 it.	Popular	 rhetoric	 today	 is	 symptomatic	
of	 this;	 for	 example,	 claiming	 that	“X	 number	 of	 children	 die	 each	 year	
of	 illnesses	 that	 could	have	been	avoided”	 suggests	 that	 someone	 is	not	
avoiding	 them	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 evil	 persists.	This	 reasoning	 justifies	








miLL, bAstiAt, And sociALism
It	 is	 worth	 remembering	 what	 Mill	 thought	 of	 one	 contemporary	




Bastiat	 shines	as	a	dialectician,	 and	his	 reasonings	 on	 free	 trade	are	
as	 strictly	 scientific	 as	 those	 of	 any	 one;	 but	 his	 posthumous	 work	
(Harmonies	 Economiques)	 is	 written	 with	 a	 parti	 pris	 of	 explaining	
away	all	the	evils	which	are	the	stronghold	of	Socialists,	against	whom	
the	book	is	directed.	(CW	XVII,	1665)




and	 shew	 how	 far	 from	 the	 truth	 it	 is	 that	 the	 economic	 phenomena	



















works,	 prepared	 the	 gradual	 transition	 of	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 liberal	






It	was	partly	by	 their	writings	 that	my	eyes	were	opened	 to	 the	very	
limited	and	temporary	value	of	the	old	political	economy,	which	assumes	
private	property	and	inheritance	as	 indefeasible	 facts,	and	freedom	of	

















not	 be	 desirable,	 or	 even	 necessary,	 that	 the	 government	 should	 take	
upon	itself,	not	because	private	individuals	cannot	effectually	perform	
it,	but	because	they	will	not.	(CW	III,	807,	945,	970)




























And	 he	 was	 not	 especially	 friendly	 with	 the	 socialist	 leaders	 of	 his	
time.	From	Avignon,	Mill	wrote	to	the	Danish	critic	Georg	Brandes	in	May	
1872:
You	 ask	 my	 opinion	 on	 the	 International…from	 the	 debates	 in	 their	
Congress	 I	 have	 not	 found	 any	 more	 common	 sense	 than	 from	 the	
English	delegates,	because	my	compatriots	are	accustomed	to	waiting	for	







grab	 the	 reins	of	government	 to	quickly	arrive	at	 their	 objective;	 this	
is	true	not	only	of	the	French	socialists,	who	are	more	moderate	than	
others,	but	more	so	in	the	case	of	the	Belgians,	Germans	and	even	the	
Swiss	 who,	 under	 the	 apparent	 direction	 of	 some	 Russian	 theorists,	
think	 that	 it	 is	 enough	 to	 expropriate	 everybody	 and	 topple	 existing	
governments,	 without	 worrying	 about	 what	 might	 replace	 them.	 (CW	
XVII,	1874,	written	in	French)
This	“qualified”	socialist	(CW	1,	199),	a	supporter	of	free	competition,	
was,	 however,	 expelled	 from	 the	 Cobden	 Club	 for	 his	 ideas	 on	 private	







	 Later	 liberalism	 lost	 even	more	 of	 its	 original	 skepticism	of	 the	





to	 promote	 liberty	 (Berger	 1984,	 203-4;	 Robson	 1998,	 484-6;	 McCarthy	
1978,	208-10).	In	Green	we	see	almost	every	aspect	of	current	democratic	
socialism,	 with	 the	 anti-liberal	 key	 of	 the	 common	 citizenry	 and	 the	
State	viewed	not	as	coercive	but	as	liberating;	he	reproaches	Mill	for	not	






of	power	—whether	 inhabiting	 the	political	 center	or	 right.	Such	flabby	
contemporary	 thought	 now	 hails	 him	 for	 being	 social	 or	 progressive,	



















Utilitarianism	 rejects	 a	 priori	 existing	 institutions	 in	 “an	 implicit	
denial	 that	 existing	 arrangements	 contain	 a	 presumption	 in	 their	 own	
favor”,	and	believes	acts	are	good	if	their	consequences	are	good,	allowing	
for	the	changing	of	any	agreement	for	improvement:	
Despite	 his	 non-interventionist	 reputation,	 this	 was	 precisely	 J.	 S.	
Mill’s	position.	He	held	that	a	departure	from	laissez	faire	involving	an	
“unnecessary	increase”	in	the	power	of	government	was	a	“certain	evil”	
unless	 required	 by	 “some	 great	 good”—greater	 than	 the	 evil	 in	 order	
that	the	balance	of	good	and	bad	consequences	should	be	good.	(Jasay	
1985,	90)
A fALse morAL superiority






















(Hamburger	 1999;	 Raeder	 2002).	 Attacking	 religion,	 like	 relativizing	
Christian	 morality,	 is	 a	 characteristic	 mark	 of	 anti-liberalism	 and	 is	
evident	in	the	progressive	reaction	to	the	two	most	recent	Popes	who	openly	
questioned	socialism	and	who,	as	a	result,	the	left	classified	as	dangerous	
extremists	 –already	 in	 the	 1800’s	 Catalan	 liberal	 Laureano	 Figuerola	
referred	to	socialists	as	“the	monks	of	the	nineteenth	century”	(Figuerola	
1991,	xxxvii)	who	aspire	to	replace	Christianity	with	their	own	creed.
Attempting	 to	 substitute	 reason	 for	 religion	 and	 morality	 has	 two	
aspects	 related	 to	 liberty.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 if	 one	 can	 play	 with	 those	
institutions	without	limit,	important	checks	to	power	are	lost.	Hayek	points	
out	 that	 Mill	 was	 close	 to	 the	 enlightened	 rationalist	 school	 of	 thought	
that	tended	to	reject	established	practice	(the	consuetudinary)	not	based	
on	reason,	and	which	had	already	at	 that	 time	turned	 the	presumption	
favoring	 liberty	 to	 one	 opposing	 it.	 He	 could	 support	 competition	 and	
the	 market,	 like	 many	 socialists	 today,	 but	 for	 reasons	 of	 instrumental	





Liberty	 therefore	 not	 being	 more	 fit	 than	 other	 words	 in	 some	 of	 the	
instances	 in	which	 it	has	been	used,	and	not	 so	fit	 in	others,	 the	 less	
the	use	is	made	of	 it	the	better.	I	would	no	more	use	the	word	liberty	





















the	 way	 to	 the	 confusion	 between	 public	 morality	 and	 politics	 and	 to	


























Finally,	 Mill	 presents	 some	 libertarian	 notions	 with	 unparalleled	
mastery.	And	if	his	case	for	freedom	has	been	called	a	“patchwork	mixture	
of	 insight	 and	 chaos”,	 this	 means	 that	 it	 provides	 ammunition	 both	 for	
and	against	 liberty	 (Smith	1980,	252;	Spitz	1962,	178).	To	appreciate	 it,	
the	reader	may	reflect	on	the	restrictions	authorities	now	place	on	liberty,	
from	the	most	blatant	economic	 interventionism	to	the	most	meticulous	





justification	 that	 democracy	 simply	 and	 automatically	 reflects	 citizens’	
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